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Abstract
Research on culture and emotion has moved beyond the once central nature–nurture. Evidence suggests that there are
universal constituents of emotions – the ‘emotional potential’ – rather than universal emotions. Furthermore, the emotional
constituents are assembled in culture-speciﬁc ways that are meaningful and predictable, resulting in systematic cultural
differences in ‘emotional practices’ (i.e., people’s actual emotional lives). Whereas emotions are not universal, the underlying
rule of emotional life is: Culturally adaptive emotions are more prevalent and intense. After reviewing empirical evidence for
each of these claims, we outline some of the future directions for research on culture and emotion.
Introduction
In the history of emotion research, the pendulum has swung
repeatedly between universalist and social constructionist
positions on emotions (Kitayama, last edition of the Encyclo-
pedia). Universalist approaches emphasized the evolutionary
origin of emotions, and considered them as biologically given
and invariant. In contrast, social constructionist approaches
emphasized nurture, focusing on the cultural processes shaping
emotions, and assuming that emotions were cross-culturally
different. Variability in the phenomena was thus taken to be
informative about the constitutive processes: The degree of
variability of emotion was conﬂated with their origin.
More recently, the recognition that culture itself is perhaps
the greatest evolutionary advantage of all for the human species
has shed a different light on the nature–nurture debate. Plas-
ticity – or cross-cultural variability – of emotions in ways that
ﬁt, and are adaptive to, the cultural context may itself be an
evolutionary advantage. Most scientists would agree that
human beings have some universal potential for emotions, but
also that, across cultures, emotions are conﬁgured in very
different, and uniquely adaptive, ways. The questions driving
research on culture and emotion have become more nuanced,
and focus on the ways the building blocks of emotional life are
conﬁgured in culture-speciﬁc ways.
In the next section we ﬁrst deﬁne the main concepts: culture
and emotion. A summary of research on the universality of
emotions will follow. The remainder of this review will focus
on research that systematically approaches cultural differences
in emotions.
Culture and Emotion: Definitions
Culture
Culture is the human-made part of our environment. It forms
our reality, and provides the goals, norms, and values that
guide our behavior. Culture is not just a varnished layer of
meaning onto a core of reality, but rather it shapes reality
itself; it includes the ways in which our daily lives are struc-
tured, in particular the habitual and normative ways of being,
and having interactions and relationships. Culture impor-
tantly deﬁnes the context of adaptation for each and every
individual.
The meanings and practices of self and relationships, or
‘cultural models’ vary widely between cultures, as illustrated
by the contrast between European American and East Asian
cultural models. According to middle-class European American
models of self and relating, an individual should be both
independent and autonomous. To achieve these goals, self-
esteem and individual control are important conditions to
the American way of independence, as they afford individuals
to inﬂuence (others in) the world to achieve what is best for
themselves. In contrast, the dominant goals of the self in most
East Asian cultural contexts are interdependence, relatedness,
and harmony, which can be achieved by adjusting to others. In
Japan, adjustment is thought to be facilitated by self-criticism,
because this leads the way to self-improvements.
Cultural models do not only exist in the head of individ-
uals, but also ‘in the world.’ The American practice of compli-
menting and rewarding each other for every level of
achievement is an example, and so are the politeness rules and
the sessions of critical self-reﬂection in Japan. Therefore,
cultural models invariantly deﬁne an individual’s context of
adaptation, even if not every individual engages in these
models in exactly the same way.
Emotion
Emotions are ﬁrst, and foremost, intentions to act (e.g., Frijda,
2007). Emotions are not just subjective feelings, but having an
emotion also means a commitment to act. To take anger as an
example: The experience of anger implies an attitude of
nonacceptance, and the assessment that others will, or at the
very least should, accommodate your wishes, goals, and
values. Emotions thus serve important functions in relation-
ships; according to some, the adaptive advantage of emotions
is precisely that they help to coordinate and regulate rela-
tionships (e.g., Keltner and Haidt, 1999). Moreover, emotions
communicate these intentions to act to others: Anger
communicates that the person is not likely to accept the
current state-of-affairs.
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If emotions are commitments to act, it can be seen why
they have cultural meaning. Some acts are consistent with the
cultural models of self and relationships, whereas others are
inconsistent. The philosopher Robert Solomon tried to explain
why anger might be so much more rare among the Utku,
a group of Inuit living in the Arctic Canada, than in America
(2002: 139): Anger “is as basic to American culture as an
emotion can be” because it ﬁts with the notion of entitlement
and control. On the other hand, anger is quite absent in the
lives of the Utku Inuits, because it is incompatible with their
‘rational’ worldview and includes unjustiﬁable judgments and
structures. As a result, anger plays no socially acceptable role in
their society (Solomon, 2002).
In Pursuit of Universal Building Blocks:
The Emotion Potential
Much of the psychological research on culture and emotion
focuses on the potential of emotions: that is, the human capacity
to have certain emotions. This research is less concerned with
the actual emotions people in different countries have, the
so-called emotion practice, than with people’s ability for these
emotions. In the next section, we will discuss two schools of
thought on emotional potential that both have inspired the
research on culture and emotion.
Universal Emotions
One school of thought that has inspired much of the psycho-
logical research on culture and emotions assumes that certain
emotions, so-called ‘basic emotions,’ are universal building
blocks of emotional life (e.g., Ekman, 1992). The underlying
idea is that basic emotions have evolved for their adaptive
value in dealing with fundamental life tasks: Emotions prepare
for actions that were particularly useful for recurrent life tasks in
our evolutionary past. For instance, anger protects us from
exploitation. Most basic emotion theories also assume that
each basic emotion (1) corresponds to one particular adaptive
value, and (2) is characterized by its own set of unique features
(antecedent events, facial and vocal expressions, physiology).
Cross-cultural research designed to prove the universality of
basic emotions relied on the observable features characteristic
of the basic emotions: facial and vocal expressions, and
physiological response patterns.
Universal Emotions? Evidence from Studies
on Expressive Behavior
Paul Ekman’s research on facial recognition of emotions is
a showcase example of the paradigm most commonly used
(e.g., Ekman and Friesen, 1969). Ekman and colleagues
showed pictures of faces to participants from a large range of
different cultures (among them illiterate, remote cultures), and
asked them to identify the emotion in the face by choosing one
emotion out of a list. Even people from very different, non-
Western cultures were able to correctly identify a number
of emotions above chance. This was seen as proof for the
universality of basic emotions. Similar studies have been re-
ported for vocal expression, and yield comparable results (e.g.,
Sauter et al., 2010).
To be fair, basic emotion theorists did not deny differences
in the practice of emotional expression. In fact, basic emotion
theorists postulated the notion of ‘display rules’ to account for
these differences. Display rules are the “cultural norms that
dictate the management and modiﬁcation of emotional
displays depending on social circumstances” (Ekman and
Friesen, 1969). Display rules have been found to differ across
cultures. For instance, Matsumoto et al. (2008) asked partici-
pants from 32 different countries what they should do if they felt
each of seven emotions (anger, contempt, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, and surprise) on a scale ranging from
emotion expression to nonexpression or masking (i.e., hide
emotion with smile). The strongest differences in display rules
were found for high-activation positive emotions, with the
level of individualism of a country predicting the extent to
which it was considered good to express positive emotions. (In
Section Emotional Frequency and Intensity we will return to
the ﬁnding that individualist cultures seem to value high-
activation positive emotions more than collectivist cultures.)
There is little research linking display rules to actual expression.
Display rules are expected to inﬂuence expressive practices, but
not the recognition of emotion.
Facial and vocal recognition studies, though designed to
ﬁnd universality, also yielded important and persistent cultural
differences in emotions. Granted, people across cultures iden-
tiﬁed certain facial and vocal expressions above chance, but
percentages of correct identiﬁcation largely varied (ranging
from about 20 to 95%), depending on both the culture and the
emotion considered. Moreover, a systematic in-group advan-
tage occurred, meaning that facial expressions were always best
recognized by people from the same culture (for a meta-
analysis see Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002). Recognition of
facial expressions was also improved for perceivers who had
been exposed to the culture of the sender, or whose culture was
similar to the sender’s culture.
The notion of a biological hard-wired ‘language of
emotions,’ in the form of universal facial and vocal expres-
sions, has itself been challenged. In a series of ingenious
experiments, Rachel Jack and her colleagues compared the
mental representations of facial expressions of six basic
emotions (the same six that were included in the studies by
Paul Ekman and colleagues) with a technique called ‘reverse
correlation.’ This technique starts from gray-scale pictures of
race-, gender-, and emotion-neutral faces that are covered
with a random pattern of black and white dots (white noise).
In each trial, one pixel is varied, after which participants
choose one emotion out of the six basic emotions identiﬁed
by Ekman and colleagues; they also have the option to
answer ‘I don’t know.’ By aggregating the facial stimuli of all
trials that are classiﬁed as a certain emotion, the researchers
established the mental representation of facial expressions
associated with the emotion. In research comparing Western
European and East Asian samples, Jack found the represen-
tations of facial expressions to be different: the eyebrow and
mouth regions were important in Western representations,
whereas the eye region, particularly the gaze direction, was
important in East Asian representations of facial expressions
(Jack et al., 2011). Therefore, the idea of universal facial
emotion signals has been challenged by neuropsychological
research.
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Using a number of behavioral tasks, Maria Gendron and her
colleagues also challenged the idea of universal vocal and facial
signals of emotions (Gendron et al., 2014 a,b). In their
experiments, they tested if facial and vocal expressions would
be recognized without providing ‘basic emotion’ words by
people from an isolated culture. Himba participants, an ethnic
group living in the remote parts of northwestern Namibia,
freely labeled, sorted, or matched emotional expressions.
Throughout different tasks, the Himba differentiated between
positive and negative emotional expressions, and to some
extent between high and low activation expressions, but they
did not clearly distinguish between discrete emotions. The
studies did not provide support for the idea of a universal
language for basic emotions: If anything, people universally
distinguish between vocal and facial expressions of positive
and negative affect.
Universal Emotions? Evidence from Studies
on Physiological Responses
Other research aimed at showing cross-cultural similarity in
the patterns of physiological responses associated with several
basic emotions (e.g., Levenson et al., 1992). Reliable measures
of physiological responding in emotion are hard to obtain,
because strong emotions are difﬁcult to induce in the lab, and
outside of the laboratory many factors confound measures
of emotional responding. Therefore, the scientists relied on a
directed facial action task, a task that was built on the
assumption that a particular set of different emotion features
(facial expression, physiological responding) is linked invar-
iantly to one emotion. In this task, participants’ physiological
responses were measured (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance,
respiration) while they followed instructions to move speciﬁc
facial muscles in ways that characterize one of the basic
emotions. For instance, the instructions for a disgust expres-
sion were to (1) wrinkle your nose while keeping your mouth
open, (2) pull down your lower lip, and (3) move your tongue
forward without sticking it out. A study comparing North
American male college students, and men from a remote
illiterate culture – the Minangkabau, a relationship-oriented
matriarchal society on Western Sumatra, Indonesia – yielded
largely similar patterns of physiological response upon the
same directed facial action (Levenson et al., 1992). Based on
this ﬁnding, the authors concluded universality in
physiological response patterns associated with the basic
emotions.
This interpretation has been challenged. First, it is not clear
what the cross-cultural similarity in physiological responses
means, given that several meta-reviews of research in exclu-
sively Western cultural settings have failed to ﬁnd distinctive
physiological patterns of presumed basic emotions (see, e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 1993). Second, even if the directed action
task yielded similarities in physiological responses, it also
yielded a very signiﬁcant difference between the American and
the Minangkabau groups: In contrast to the American partic-
ipants, the Minangkabau did not report feeling the matching
emotion. One explanation for this difference was suggested by
Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, two prominent cultural
psychologists: The Minangkabau conceive of emotions as
social events, and did not infer an emotional experience in the
context of the directed action task, where the respondents
were by themselves (Markus and Kitayama, 1994). In sum,
evidence for basic emotions from physiological research is
weak at best.
Basic Emotions as Universal Building Blocks
Evidence from research on the measurable features of
emotion – expressive behavior and physiological responses –
fails to support the basic emotion view. Note that the basic
emotions tradition has not generated any research on
the subjective experience of emotion; the latter was taken to
be unanalyzable. In the next section, we discuss the
componential view on emotions that has produced many
cross-cultural studies on emotional experience.
Universal Components
Another school of thought, componential theory, focuses on
the components of emotional experience (e.g., Frijda, 2007).
Componential theory proposes that emotional experience can
be further analyzed in terms of more basic and universal
emotional components. In addition, the relationship between
these components and the emotional experience is universal
(Mesquita and Ellsworth, 2001): If the same set of components
occur cross-culturally, the same emotional experiences will too.
Cross-cultural research in this area has mainly focused on
the two core components of emotional experience: appraisals
and action readiness. Appraisal refers to the individual’s
assessment of the meaning and relevance of a certain situation
to the individual, and is usually represented as the pattern of
outcomes on several dimensions of meaning (e.g., to what
extent was the situation either pleasant or unpleasant, either
conducive or harmful to self-esteem). Action readiness refers to
the motivated goal in the (social) situation, and is usually
represented as an urge to act in certain ways (e.g., to what extent
did you feel the urge to withdraw from the situation, aggress
toward the other person), or as a change in the direction of the
relationship with the (social) environment (e.g., moving away,
moving against). Appraisal and action readiness have been
thought to constitute emotional experience as well as organize
all the other components.
The Universal Component–Emotion Link
The paradigm of most componential research consists of self-
report studies. Participants report real-life events in which
they have experienced a given emotion (and its translations
in different cultures), and then rate their experience in that
same situation with respect to several emotion components:
appraisal dimensions and/or action readiness modes. It is
important to mention that the dimensions of meaning
(appraisal, action readiness) have typically been theoretically
derived by researchers from Western cultures, and that little
effort has been made to establish for each culture what the
most central dimensions of meaning are.
The largest cross-cultural study using this paradigm was
conducted by Klaus Scherer and his colleagues, and included
students from 37 different countries from all over the world
(Scherer, 1997a,b; ISEAR database by Scherer and Wallbott, see
http://www.affective-sciences.org/researchmaterial). The study
investigates to what extent the dimensions of appraisal and
action readiness mapped onto several emotions (mostly of the
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kind that Ekman and colleagues had studied) in cross-
culturally similar ways. It yielded substantial support for
cross-cultural similarity: A similar core of appraisals and
action readiness was associated with each of the seven
emotions included. The study yielded some differences in the
link between components and emotions as well, to which we
will return (Section Emotional Frequency and Intensity).
Evidence for cross-cultural similarities in the set of appraisal
(or action readiness) dimensions comes from a slightly
different approach to the same data. Several researchers have
examined whether the same set of component dimensions
cross-culturally discriminated between different emotions, at
least to some extent. They found this to be partly the case:
Component dimensions accounted at the most for 40% of
the variance in emotions, and this held true across different
cultures.
Whereas the same set of components meaningfully
distinguished between emotions in different cultures, it did
not completely account for the differentiation between
emotions (40% is still a long way from 100%). Moreover,
across cultures, the degree to which individual appraisal and
action readiness dimensions (e.g., pleasantness) discriminated
between emotions was different.
Differences may have been underestimated, because all
studies started from equivalent emotion words in different
languages, whose selection may have been based on similari-
ties in the associated meanings to begin with. Thus, ﬁnding
similarity in the components associated with these emotion
words may have merely conﬁrmed the accuracy of translation.
To our knowledge, not very many studies have shown a link
between emotional components and other features of
emotion. An exception is work by Anna Tcherkassof who
conducted a cross-cultural recognition study among Burkina
Faso and French participants, in which participants identiﬁed
the action readiness associated with facial expressions.
The study was inspired by Nico Frijda’s theory of facial
expression as the initial manifestation of action readiness.
This study found that the rates of recognition, based on
action readiness, did not signiﬁcantly differ between
cultures, and were also no worse than recognition rates
obtained by studies in which participants judge the emotion
expressed by a face (Tcherkassof and de Suremain, 2005). In
addition to suggesting that action readiness is an important
dimension of emotional meaning, because it differentiates
between facial expressions, the ﬁndings also show that
action readiness is no worse candidate for a universal
building block than the basic emotions that were proposed
by Ekman.
Understanding Indigenous Emotions
from Universal Components
The use of the componential approach is perhaps better illus-
trated by the way it renders unfamiliar emotions comprehen-
sible. An example comes from a study on amae, which is
considered a ‘culturally unique’ emotion for the Japanese
culture (Niiya et al., 2006). Amae is deﬁned as the ability to
depend and presume upon another’s love or bask in another’s
indulgence, and cannot be translated by any one English
emotion word. However, Niiya and colleagues found that
North American participants responded with similar appraisals
to amae-eliciting vignettes (i.e., a friend makes an inappropriate
request for help) as were found in Japanese. Therefore, amaewas
rendered comprehensible by studying its associated compo-
nents. The componential approach has provided a language to
compare emotional experience cross-culturally in terms of both
the personal relevance of the situation (appraisal) and the
actions afforded (action readiness).
Conclusion
Appraisal and action readiness dimensions make unfamiliar
emotions comprehensible, which is proof of their usefulness.
Yet, a reason to be critical is that much of the research has
adopted preconceived dimensions of appraisal and action
readiness. Whereas some of these dimensions have a logic
appeal, there is no evidence that these dimensions are the
ones that are cross-culturally the most salient elements of
meaning. Consistently, the combined dimensions adopted
in research explain no more than about 40% of the variance
in emotions, and the importance of a given dimension
differs across cultures.
Toward an Understanding of Cultural Variations
in Emotion: the Emotion Practice
Despite marked differences, the commonality between
different approaches searching for universals (basic emotions,
componential approaches) is that they lack a theory to predict
or explain cultural differences in emotions. In this section, we
will review research that shows the profound role of culture in
the daily emotional experiences of people. The research
reviewed generally assumes that emotions, or emotion
components, that are ‘helpful’ or ‘functional’ in a culture will
be more frequent or intense (see for detailed overviews
Mesquita, 2003; Mesquita and Leu, 2007). Below, we will
illustrate several lines of research that explain variation in
emotional practice from central cultural differences.
Emotional Frequency and Intensity
Cultural differences exist with regard to the most frequent and
intense emotions. These differences are systematic and mean-
ingful. In one series of studies, Shinobu Kitayama and his
colleagues compared emotional experience in the United States
and Japan, using a culture-sensitive, bottom-up approach (e.g.,
Kitayama et al., 2000; Kitayama et al., 2006).
In a ﬁrst study, participants from both cultures rated the
similarity between different emotion words representing not
only common American emotion words, but also common
Japanese emotion words (and their translations). An
emotional space deﬁned by the dimensions of valence (posi-
tive, negative) and social engagement (socially engaging, dis-
engaging) emerged from these ratings. Socially engaging
emotions, such as friendliness (positive) and shame (nega-
tive), reinforce and underline the relationship. In contrast,
socially disengaging emotions such as pride (positive) and
anger (negative) reinforce and underline the autonomy (and
superiority) of the individual.
Many previous studies have established valence as an
important dimension of differentiation between emotions, but
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the ﬁnding of social engagement as a dimension deﬁning of
emotions is new. Therefore, the ﬁrst point to note is that the
inclusion of the most common Japanese emotion words (and
their translations in English) yielded a different structure of
meaning than previous research that started from Western
emotion words only. Social engagement is an obvious candi-
date for a dimension of appraisal that has not been included in
most appraisal theories (but see research on the emotional
dimension of Power or Dominance – which may partially
overlap with the dimension of Social Engagement – e.g.,
Fontaine et al., 2013).
Subsequent studies by Kitayama and his colleagues yielded
support for the idea that the emotions that are most helpful in
coordinating the relationships in a given cultural context are
experienced most frequently and intensely. These studies found
that socially disengaging emotions (e.g., pride, anger) were
most frequent and intense in European American cultural
contexts where good relationships are deﬁned by the autonomy
and independence between individuals. In contrast, socially
disengaging emotions (e.g., pride, anger) were more frequent
and intense in East Asian cultural contexts where good rela-
tionships are deﬁned by the relatedness and interdependence
of the partners. Emotions that ﬁt the cultural models are both
more frequent and intense; therefore, there are cultural differ-
ences in emotional practice.
Not only the frequency and intensity of emotions as such
but also of individual emotional components can be predicted
from cultural models (Mesquita and Leu, 2007). For example,
agency appraisals (responsibility, control) have been found in
many different studies to be more frequent in Western, inde-
pendent cultures where an individual’s agency is deemed more
central and important than in nonwestern interdependent
cultures. Naturally, the occurrence of certain appraisals may
also account for the occurrence of the matching emotions:
Claiming responsibility would go with pride (Imada and
Ellsworth, 2011)
The Role of Situations
One reason for cultural differences in emotional practice may
be that, across cultures, people encounter different types of
situations. For example, it is possible that people in some
cultures simply receive more compliments than in other
cultures, and thus experience more pride. Several studies have
suggested that the situations that are likely to occur within
a culture are far from random: There will be more opportunities
for situations that elicit emotions that are consistent with the
prevailing cultural models.
In a series of comparative survey studies from our own lab,
we predicted the frequency of a set of emotion-eliciting situa-
tions from (1) their potential to elicit a given emotion and (2)
the value of that emotion within the particular culture (Boiger
et al., 2013; Boiger et al., 2014). The research focused on shame
and anger. In a comparison between the United States and
Japan, the researchers expected that anger situations in the
United States would be afforded, because anger is a hallmark of
autonomy and independence. In contrast, anger was expected
to be avoided in Japan, where it violates the interdependent
model of relatedness and harmony. Conversely, shame was
expected to be condoned in Japan, where it is consistent with
the ideal of self-reﬂection and self-improvement, whereas it
was expected to be condemned in the United States, because
it undermines positive self-regard, which is a cornerstone of
the US cultural model. Consistent with these expectations,
the researchers found that the higher the potency of
a situation to elicit (high intensity) anger, the higher its
frequency was rated in the United States, and the lower in
Japan; conversely, the higher the potency of a situation to
elicit (high intensity) shame, the lower its rated frequency in
the United States, and the higher in Japan. More reﬁned
analyses of the differences between cultures may thus serve to
predict which situations are culturally promoted, and which
situations are avoided.
Research by Jeanne Tsai and her colleagues has found that
individuals seek out those emotions that afford important
cultural tasks: inﬂuencing in the United States, and adjusting in
East Asian cultures. Consistently, European Americans ‘ideally
wanted to feel’ more high-activation positive states than East
Asians, and East Asians ‘ideally wanted to feel’ more low-
activation positive emotional states than European Americans
(e.g., Tsai et al., 2006). In one within-culture experimental
study, Tsai and colleagues found clear evidence that ideal
emotions were associated with the task at hand. American
participants valued high-arousal positive states more after
being assigned the task to inﬂuence others, and low-arousal
positive states after they were asked to adjust to others (i.e.,
suppress personal needs and change their own behaviors to
meet others’ needs; Tsai et al., 2007).
Across studies, people select situations that will lead to the
culturally valued emotions. When given a choice, European
Americans in an experimental setting consistently selected
artifacts (e.g., CDs) that elicited high-arousal over those
eliciting low-arousal activities, whereas the reverse was
true for East Asians (Tsai et al., 2007: Study 4). Societal
statistics conﬁrmed these experimental results: North
Americans consistently preferred recreative drugs, leisure
activities, and music preferences that elicited high-arousal
positive emotions over those eliciting low-arousal positive
emotions, whereas there was a preference for activities that
elicit low-arousal positive emotions in East Asian societies.
Moreover, within a North American sample, individual
differences in ideal affect in fact predicted preferential
activities (leisure time, drugs, types of vacations) in ways
that mirrored cultural differences between North Americans
and East Asians (Tsai, 2007).
The Role of Concern Salience
Why people evaluate a situation as pleasant or unpleasant
differs in ways that more or less follow from the important
cultural models of independence and interdependence.
In experience sampling research, Mesquita and Karasawa
(2002) found that in an American group of college
students, events were rated as pleasant (or, to the contrary,
unpleasant) to the extent they were relevant to independent
concerns, such as self-esteem and being in control. In
contrast, pleasantness in a Japanese group was judged as
much by independent as by interdependent concerns;
examples of the latter are feelings of closeness and other
people’s (im)moral behavior.
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Consistently, European Americans and Asian Americans
showed enhanced emotional reactivity when the dominant
aspects of their self-concept were activated (Chentsova-
Dutton and Tsai, 2010). In experimental research, priming
individual aspects of the self led to greater levels of positive
emotions and smiling in European Americans, whereas
priming of relational aspects of the self was associated
with greater emotional reactivity in Asian Americans.
Emotions are more intense when they are about culturally
focal concerns (including culturally central aspects of the
self).
Recent research from our own lab has found that culturally
focal concerns do not only affect the intensity of emotions, but
also the types of emotions (De Leersnyder et al., submitted).
Belgian and Turkish respondents indicated how relevant
emotional situations were to both self-focused values (e.g.,
personal success) and other-focused values (e.g., loyalty).
Across studies using different methods, we found that
situations that self-focused values elicited more disengaging
emotions (pride, anger), whereas other-focused values
elicited more engaging emotions (friendliness, shame). In
addition, we found that the frequency with which these
values were perceived as relevant to Belgian students’
emotional situations exactly mirrored young Belgians’ value
hierarchy (i.e., most important values as ‘guiding principles
in people’s life’), as obtained from a national representative
sample by the European Social Survey (ESS round5;
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2012; De Leersnyder
and Mesquita, in preparation). Together, these ﬁndings
suggest that cultural differences in the salience of certain
values may be one of the reasons for differences in the rates
and intensity of engaging and disengaging emotions.
Feeling Culturally Appropriate Emotions Is Rewarding
If emotions of people from different cultures are different, then,
by the same token, emotions of people within one culture
should converge. In fact, recent research has suggested that the
emotional experiences of immigrants over time grow more
similar to the emotions of people from the new culture; and
that intergroup contact promotes this emotional acculturation
(see, e.g., De Leersnyder et al., 2011).
We have suggested that cultural differences in emotional
phenomena can be understood from their functionality to the
culture. What is the evidence that this is so? Several studies
have found evidence that ﬁtting in, or having the same
emotions as most others in your culture, is beneﬁcial; or
conversely, that not having the emotions that are culturally
aspired can be harmful. For instance, subjective well-being
(good feelings) was more closely related to engaging positive
emotions (e.g., friendly feelings, respect) in Japan, but to
disengaging emotions (e.g., pride, superiority) in the United
States (Kitayama et al., 2006). In more recent research from
our own lab, we found that emotional ﬁt with the cultural
average predicted relational well-being; this was true in three
different cultures: the United States, Belgium, and Turkey
(De Leersnyder et al., 2014). Finally, Tsai et al. (2007) found
that depression, the opposite of well-being, was predicted by
the differences between culturally ideal emotions and
a person’s actual emotions. In the Chinese sample the
relative absence of low-activation positive emotions
predicted depression, but in the American sample it was the
relative absence of high-activation positive emotions. In sum,
individuals have better outcomes when they are more
similar to others in their culture.
Emerging Trends
Research on culture and emotion has moved beyond the
dichotomous question of whether emotions are nature or
nurture, and has started to investigate more nuanced and
detailed questions. It is clear that some of the building blocks
of emotions may be universal in ways that make it possible to
largely comprehend emotional lives in other cultures, even if
they are very different from our own. It is equally clear that the
emotional lives of people in different cultures vary in system-
atic, predictable, and meaningful ways. Moreover, the cultural
differences are dictated by, what could be considered, universal
rules: People have emotions that are helpful in their own
cultural context. There is plasticity in emotions, even in later
life: When immigrants move to a new cultural context, their
emotions slowly adapt.
Whereas our knowledge of cultural similarities and differ-
ences in emotions has become much more detailed and
systematic, insight into the processes that lead to cross-
culturally different emotional lives is still very limited. These
processes constitute the challenge of future research on
culture and emotion. Two emerging trends will be discussed
below.
Emerging Trends: Emotions as Momentary Constructions
Emotions are increasingly seen as constructions in the moment
(Barrett, 2006; Mesquita and Boiger, 2014), rather than pre-
established entities, with the implication that an emotion
concept may be constructed differently across both contexts
and cultures. In this regard, the ﬁnding from the Directed
Action Task that American men and Minangkabau men did not
construct their facial expressions to signal a subjective feeling of
emotion is interesting (Levenson et al., 1992). The ﬁnding
suggests that the construction of an emotion is not just bottom-
up, as in constituted by appraisals, action readiness, and self-
perceived facial expression, but also top-down, guided by the
culture’s lay theory of emotion. The idea is consistent with
psychological constructivist theories of emotion (e.g., Barrett,
2006).
Another consequence of this view that emotions are con-
structed in the moment is that emotions are differently
constituted at different moments in time (even within one
culture). To do justice to the complex nature of emotional
experience, we recently conducted a study that established the
variety of patterns of appraisal and action readiness that were
associated with anger and shame in three different cultures:
United States, Belgium, and Japan. In each of these cultures, we
observed the same three varieties of patterns for each emotion,
but not at the same rates. The dominant patterns (of appraisals
and action readiness) differed by culture, such that the culture
of the participant was accurately predicted in 40–50% of the
cases (Boiger et al., in preparation).
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Emerging Trends: Emotions as Relational Constructs
A second trend emerging in (cultural) research on emotions
is to study emotion in their social and relational context
(Butler, 2011; Mesquita, 2010; Mesquita and Boiger, 2014). In
particular, researchers have started to study how this social
context helps to create and regulate the ﬁt of emotions with
cultural norms, and also, in the long run, how it helps to
develop culturally adaptive emotional dispositions. The best
examples come from developmental psychology. In one cross-
cultural study in Germany and Japan, Trommsdorff and
Kornadt (2003) compared the emotional interactions
between mothers and their children when the child had dis-
obeyed. They found that German mothers readily attributed
blame to their children, therefore reacting with anger. An
escalation of anger and resistance would ensue. The conﬂict
ended unresolved, leaving both the mother and the child angry
and hurt. A very different interaction pattern was observed in
Japanese mother–child dyads: Japanese mothers were more
likely to interpret disobedience empathetically (“the child is
just a child, is too much absorbed in playing, is too tired”;
Trommsdorff and Kornadt, 2003: 296), and to react in an
accommodating manner. The Japanese mothers remained
friendly, though they kept insisting that the child obeyed.
Even though repeated failure of the child to give in would get
them disappointed, they avoided putting relational harmony
in jeopardy. In the end, both parties started making partial
concessions, thus protecting the desired feeling of oneness
(ittaikan), and reinstating harmony. Both interactions were
constructed based on cultural models of self and relationship.
German mother–child interaction accomplished the cultural
model of independence and autonomy by inﬂuencing and
asserting oneself, whereas Japanese interactions accomplished
harmony and relatedness by adjustment and empathy.
The mother–child interactions had long-term effects on
children’s relational patterns: In both cultures, the escalation
of interactions in early childhood negatively predicted the
level of empathy-based altruism and positively predicted
aggression 9 years later. These interaction patterns can,
therefore, be understood as necessary socialization
experiences: Independent German children learn to assert
themselves, whereas interdependent Japanese children learn
to accommodate and to place relational harmony over
individual desires. This example vividly shows how social
context and emotions are intricately interwoven in ways that
are consistent with the prevalent cultural meanings.
This example shows how engagement in culturally partic-
ular social interactions and relationships directly shapes
emotions (cf. Kitayama et al., 2009). Therefore, culture’s
inﬂuence on emotions is not merely mediated by beliefs (e.g.,
Matsumoto, 1990), but rather afforded and scaffolded by social
interactions as they evolve in a particular culture. It is the future
of culture and emotion research to further probe the ways in
which culture is produced and reproduced in emotional
interactions, a process known as the ‘microgenesis of culture’
(Kashima, 2008).
See also: Affect-Regulation Motivation; Collectivism and
Individualism: Cultural and Psychological Concerns;
Counseling and Psychotherapy: Ethnic and Cultural
Differences; Cross-Cultural Psychology; Cross-Cultural
Research Methods in Psychology; Cross-Cultural Training in
Industrial and Organizational Psychology; Cultural Inﬂuences
on Interpersonal Relationships; Cultural Psychology; Culture
and the Self: Implications for Psychological Theory; Early
Emotional Development and Cultural Variability; Emotion and
Expression; Emotion in Cognition; Emotion, Perception and
Expression of; Emotional Development, Effects of Parenting
and Family Structure on; Emotional Intelligence and
Competencies; Emotional Regulation; Emotions and Health;
Emotions and Work; Emotions, Psychological Structure of;
Facial Emotion Expression, Individual Differences in;
Immigration: Social Psychological Aspects; Migration,
Ethnicity, Aging and Social Work Practice; Mother-Child
Communication: Cultural Differences; Self and Emotional
Development in Adulthood and Later Life; Selfconscious
Emotions, Psychology of; Social and Emotional Development
in the Context of the Family; Subjective Wellbeing and Culture;
Values, Psychology of.
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